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Abstract: 
This article re-examines the declining influence of Jamaican sugar planters within the British 
Empire during the period between the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 and 
Parliament’s decision to abolish the slave trade in 1807. Much of the existing scholarship 
emphasises the consequences of the American Revolutionary War and rise of abolitionism 
during the 1780s as pivotal to the fall of the planters. This article argues that those 
challenges did not determine the fate of the Jamaican planters. Rather, it was the 
radicalisation of the French and Haitian Revolutions, and the extended period of war that 
began in 1793, that led to their eventual defeat over the question of the slave trade. 
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During the mid-eighteenth century, sugar planters in the British Caribbean had good reason to 
believe that their class would define the future. Before 1775, the owners of the large slave-run 
sugar plantations that dominated the landscapes and economies of British Caribbean islands 
were not only among the wealthiest people in the British Empire but also some of the most 
influential. They were heavily integrated into the political economy and political culture of 
their empire. Whether they lived on their estates in the Caribbean or as absentees in Britain, 
the planters presented themselves as champions of political liberties and property rights that 
were cherished by economically aspirant Protestant British men on either side of the Atlantic. 
They therefore had many good reasons to feel confident about their place at the cutting edge 
of British imperial development. This article looks at the planters of the most extensive and 
prosperous sugar island in the British Empire, Jamaica, to offer a new perspective on their fall 
from this position of wealth and power – a fall linked to the rise of an abolitionist movement 
that was able, eventually, to begin to deconstruct the system of slavery on which planter 
wealth and power depended, starting with the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in 1807. 
As Christopher Brown has observed, the history of the politics of slavery in the British 
Atlantic world can ‘be told as the rise and fall of the British Atlantic planter class’.1 Moreover, 
we can only fully understand the fall of the planters and the dismantling of slavery by looking 
at these things within the wider context of a complicated struggle over the future of the British 
Empire. To do this, it is necessary to connect colonial histories with histories of British 
political culture and to recognise, as Steve Pincus has suggested, that the British state during 
                                                 
1 Christopher Leslie Brown, ‘The Politics of Slavery’, in The British Atlantic World, 1500–
1800, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2009), 232-
250, quote at 249. Brown’s comment references the classic work by Lowell J. Ragatz, The 
Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763–1833 (New York: Century Company, 
1928). 
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the eighteenth century was a transatlantic and pan-imperial patchwork.2 This article seeks to 
take up those challenges, improving our understanding of the transformation of the British 
Empire during the Age of Revolution thorough a study of politics at a colonial ‘periphery’.3 It 
builds on recent studies of slaveholder politics and on new work emphasising the political 
impact of rebellion and revolution by enslaved people in the colonies. It seeks to examine 
significant colonial contributions to transatlantic political discussions about the future of the 
empire between the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 and Parliament’s decision 
to end the slave trade in 1807. In particular, it considers the ability (and inability) of the 
Jamaican planter class to resist metropolitan impositions and the impact of the Haitian 
Revolution on its capacity to defend its interests.4  
                                                 
2 Steve Pincus, ‘Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the 
Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, William and Mary Quarterly 69, 
no. 1 (2012): 3-34. 
3 Much of the scholarship on the conflict over the future of the slave trade has focused on 
British abolitionist arguments, organisation and mobilisation of popular opinion. Defining 
texts include David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975); Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and 
British Abolition, 1760–1810 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1975); J. R. Oldfield, 
Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion against the 
Slave Trade, 1787–1807 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
4 For examples of recent work about slaveholders and their politics, see Trevor Burnard, 
Planters, Merchants, and Slaves: Plantation Societies in British America, 1650–1820 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); David Beck Ryden, West Indian Slavery and 
British Abolition, 1783–1807 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); David 
Lambert, White Creole Culture, Politics and Identity during the Age of Abolition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christer Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica: Colonial 
Society and Culture during the Era of Abolition (London: Pickering Chatto, 2009); Srividhya 
Swaminathan, Debating the Slave Trade: Rhetoric of British National Identity, 1759–1815 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009). Claudius Fergus has recently re-emphasised the influence of 
actions by enslaved people in the Caribbean on the British abolition debates. Claudius K. 
Fergus, ‘“Dread of Insurrection”: Abolitionism, Security, and Labor in Britain’s West Indian 
Colonies, 1760–1823’, William and Mary Quarterly: 66, no. 4 (2009): 757-80; Idem, 
Revolutionary Emancipation: Slavery and Abolitionism in the British West Indies (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013). For an older literature on this, see C.L.R. 
James, The Black Jacobins Toussaint L’Overture and the San Domingo Revolution (London: 
Secker and Warburg, 1938); Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1944), 197-208. 
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These themes are illuminated by a range of sources produced by Jamaican planters, 
including the extensive letter collection of an exceptionally wealthy and influential planter, 
Simon Taylor (1740-1813). Taylor was born to wealthy parents in Jamaica and educated in 
England, at Eton, before returning to Jamaica in 1760. By the time of the American 
Revolution, he owned three large sugar estates and, by the turn of the nineteenth century, he 
was reputedly ‘the richest proprietor in the island’. Taylor was also a linchpin in planter 
transatlantic political networks and, according to one historian, he ‘may have exercised 
greater influence in Jamaica, and for a longer period, than any other individual’.5 His rich 
personal correspondence offers a detailed insight into the political outlook of an important 
planter at the heart of the Jamaican defence of the slave trade. Read alongside the writings of 
other planters and the publications of the Jamaican legislative assembly, it offers one of the 
best available guides to the changing political views and strategies of planters in the colonies 
during the period under discussion. 
In common with much of the scholarly literature, old and new, this article sees the 
American Revolutionary War as a significant point of change in the relationship between the 
British planters of the West Indies and the metropole, but it differs by arguing that the French 
Revolution and its transatlantic consequences were more important. The parameters of 
discussion about the planters’ fall continue to be shaped by an older literature that not only 
placed a heavy emphasis on the American Revolution as a pivotal moment but also tended to 
present the rise and success of abolitionism as inevitabilities.6 Influenced by a move towards 
                                                 
5 ‘Sketch of the characters of the principal persons in office in Jamaica, 1806’, National 
Library of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica (hereafter NLJ), MS 72, Nugent Papers; Ryden, West 
Indian Slavery, 60; R.B. Sheridan, ‘Simon Taylor, Sugar Tycoon of Jamaica, 1740–1813’, 
Agricultural History 45, no. 4 (1971): 285-96, quote at p. 286. When he died in 1813, Taylor 
left an estate that amounted to about £1 million sterling, including three sugar plantations and 
more than 2000 slaves. He served in the Jamaican assembly for nearly 50 years. 
6 Ragatz argued that the plantation economy in the British Caribbean went into long-term 
decline between 1763 and 1783, an argument that influenced Williams’s Capitalism and 
Slavery, which placed special emphasis on the economic consequences of the American 
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Atlantic history, which has sought to reintegrate the study of North America with wider 
Atlantic themes, recent work has often reinforced a tendency to focus on the American 
Revolution and its consequences. Modern scholars have also tended to emphasise the 
planters’ powerlessness in the face of the nation-wide British abolitionist campaign that 
started in 1787. There has therefore been a readiness not only to see the 1780s as the 
transformative period in political relations between Britain and the West Indian colonies but 
also to assume that the long-term fate of the British-Caribbean slave system was decided 
during that decade.7 By contrast, this article sees the rising influence of the metropolitan 
campaign against the slave trade as one episode in a long-running series of disputes over the 
economic and political fabric of the British Atlantic empire and argues that the eventual 
outcome was still uncertain at the end of the 1780s. By 1789, planters in Jamaica knew they 
were confronting a special kind of threat. But they might have responded to it differently and 
more successfully, had other events not intervened. 
It was the radicalisation of the revolutions in France and Saint Domingue and the 
subsequent war between Britain and France that were decisive. Historians have paid attention 
to the French and Haitian Revolutions as important moments in the history of British slavery 
                                                                                                                                                        
Revolutionary War and shaped subsequent debates on the rise of abolitionism and the fall of 
the planters. Seymour Drescher’s Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977) dismantled Williams’s claim that the 
planters’ economic decline began in the late eighteenth century. Recent work has tended to 
accept Drescher’s thesis while arguing that the American Revolution had important negative 
political consequences for West Indian slaveholders. 
7 See Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, An Empire 
Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Trevor Burnard, ‘Powerless Masters: The Curious Decline of 
Jamaican Sugar Planters in the Foundational Period of British Abolitionism’, Slavery & 
Abolition: 32, no. 2 (2011): 185-98; Idem, ‘Harvest Years? Reconfigurations of Empire in 
Jamaica, 1756–1807’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History: 40, no. 4 (2012): 533-
55. On the emergence of a British humanitarian consensus in the years after the American 
War, see also Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1992), 350-60. 
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and abolition. But they have often focused on the anti-revolutionary sentiment that gripped 
the British establishment during the 1790s to claim that these events were impediments to 
abolitionism.8 In mapping out the impact of the French and Haitian Revolutions this article 
shows that planters were more hurt by the advent of revolution and war in the Caribbean 
during the 1790s than they were by the events of the 1780s. Eventually, this resolved the 
imperial crisis over slavery and the slave trade in favour of the abolitionists. From 1791, 
revolution and war helped persuade Jamaican planters to embrace the principles of loyal and 
patriotic counter-revolution. They were forced to accept their deepening military dependence 
on Britain whilst trying to defend a slave system that appeared to be increasingly prone to 
revolutionary upheaval. By 1807, these planters were left with little choice other than to 
accept a resounding political defeat, when Parliament abolished the slave trade. 
 
Jamaican planters 
Between 1640 and 1807, about eight and a half million enslaved Africans were forced to 
embark slave ships for the New World; about one in every three left on a vessel bound for the 
British Caribbean, and of those almost half were destined for the large island of Jamaica, 
                                                 
8 As part of his survey of the British ‘imperial meridian’, C.A. Bayly recognised the 
importance of the French Wars to the reorganisation of the transatlantic empire. See C.A. 
Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830 (London: Pearson, 
1989), 90. For an influential account of the negative effects of the French Revolution on 
abolitionist campaigning, see Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, 276-78. Other work has traced the 
impact of the transatlantic French Revolution and of the French Wars on Caribbean plantation 
societies and has begun to reassess their impact on abolitionist ideas. See David Barry Gaspar 
and David Patrick Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater 
Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); David Geggus, ‘The Caribbean in 
the Age of Revolution’, in The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760–1840, ed. David 
Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2010); Edward L. Cox, 
‘The British Caribbean in the Age of Revolution’, in Empire and Nation: The American 
Revolution in the Atlantic World, ed. Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005), 275-94. J.R. Oldfield, Transatlantic Abolitionism in the Age 
of Revolution: An International History of Anti-Slavery, c.1787–1820 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
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where vast plantations, each covering hundreds of acres, used their labour to produce the 
crops of sugar that accounted for an increasing share of the British imperial economy. Since 
the sugar revolution of the 1640s – which saw the rise of plantation slavery in the Caribbean – 
many British planters made huge, if often unstable, fortunes from the lucrative combination of 
sugar and slavery.9 Their annual incomes were erratic but could often be in excess of £2000, 
making most established planters wealthier than the majority of the English gentry. So-called 
‘absentee’ planters, who retired from the Caribbean to Britain, generally joined the ranks of 
the nation’s landed elite.10 Such individuals were at the apex of a group of about 1500 owners 
of British-Caribbean sugar plantations. Around half of this group owned properties in 
Jamaica.11 
The power of this group rested on more than the unsteady but glittering profits of 
sugar production. During the seventeenth century, white colonists formed legislative 
assemblies in the Caribbean colonies, institutions which drew their members from the ranks 
of local grandees, elected by other men of property. These legislatures framed local laws, 
                                                 
9 ‘Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database’ <http://www.slavevoyages.org> 
accessed Nov. 2015. B.W. Higman, ‘The Sugar Revolution’, Economic History Review, 53, 
no. 2 (2000): 213-36; Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the 
English West Indies, 1624–1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972); 
Jacob M. Price, ‘The Imperial Economy’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The 
Eighteenth Century, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78-104. On 
the risks of sugar planting, see Edward Long, The History of Jamaica, 3 vols (London: T. 
Lowndes, 1774), vol. 2, 544-5; Bryan Edwards, The History, Civil and Commercial, of the 
British Colonies in the West Indies, 2 vols (London: John Stockdale, 1793), vol. 2, 13-15. On 
the British fortunes made from sugar planting, see Trevor Burnard, ‘Et in Arcadia Ego: West 
Indian Planters in Glory, 1674–1784’, Atlantic Studies 9, no. 1 (2012): 19-40. 
10 On planter incomes, see Edwards, History, vol. 2, 248-60. On English gentry incomes, see 
G.E. Mingay, English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century, new ed. (1963; London: 
Routledge, 2007), 20-23. 
11 There were about 775 sugar plantations in Jamaica during the 1770s, accounting for around 
half of the sugar output of the British Caribbean colonies. The size of the planter class grew 
and shrank with the sugar economy and with the conquest or loss of British colonies in the 
West Indies. See Richard Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British 
West Indies, 1623–1775 (Barbados: Canoe Press, 1974), 223; Noel Deer, The History of 
Sugar, 2 vols (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949), vol. 1, 193-202. 
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raised local taxes and frequently came into conflict with Royal Governors, who were the local 
representatives of the Crown and heads of the executive branch of colonial government. 
Driven in part by the Revolution of 1688, property-holding Englishmen in the colonies argued 
that they had the same rights as their counterparts in England to self-representation, the rule of 
law and government by consent, defending those principles with ‘astonishing intensity and 
determination’, as Jack Greene has shown.12 For most of the eighteenth century, Caribbean 
planters were the most successful of all the elite groups in colonial British America at 
promoting and defending the rights of their legislatures, exhibiting what C.A. Bayly defined 
as a spirit of ‘fractious provincialism’, and the Jamaican assembly, in particular, was 
renowned for its exhibitions of ‘determined constitutional assertiveness’.13 Wealthy Jamaican 
planters also enjoyed considerable political influence in the metropole. They had strong 
mercantile and family connections that spanned Britain’s eighteenth-century Atlantic empire, 
and they were a leading element of the London West Indian lobby – a well-connected and 
influential group of absentee planters and sugar merchants with access to government 
ministers and other leading parliamentarians.14 
                                                 
12 Richard S. Dunn, ‘The Glorious Revolution and America’, in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire: The Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 445-466; Jack P. Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and 
Constitutional History (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 78-92; Idem, 
‘Liberty, Slavery, and the Transformation of British Identity in the Eighteenth-Century West 
Indies’, Slavery & Abolition 21, no. 1 (2000): 1-31; Idem, ‘Liberty and Slavery: The Transfer 
of British Liberty to the West Indies, 1627–1865’, in Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty 
Overseas, 1600–1900, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Idem, ‘The Jamaica Privilege Controversy, 1764–66: An Episode in the Process of 
Constitutional Definition’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22, no. 1 (1994): 
16-53, quote at 48. On colonial settlers’ constitutional arguments during the eighteenth 
century, see also Natalie Zacek, Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 1670–1776 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 219. 
13 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 90; Burnard, ‘Harvest Years’, 535. 
14 See Ryden, West Indian Slavery; B.W. Higman, ‘The West India “interest” in Parliament, 
1807–1833, Historical Studies 13, (1967): 1-19; Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation 
of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American 
Revolution’, The Historical Journal 40, no. 1 (1997): 71-95; M.W. McCahill, ed., The 
Correspondence of Stephen Fuller, 1788-1795: Jamaica, the West India Interest at 
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Twin revolutions – in sugar production and pro-colonial politics – therefore 
underpinned the prosperity and power of British colonial sugar planters, and nowhere more so 
than in Jamaica. By the 1770s, there were about 17,000 white colonists living in Jamaica, 
outnumbered ten-to-one by the enslaved population.15 Most white male colonists owned 
slaves; but fewer than five out of every 100 colonists owned a sugar plantation. This small but 
wealthy minority of local planters dominated public life, occupying almost all of the 43 seats 
in the Jamaican assembly.16 The sugar output of Jamaica increased from about 10,000 tons in 
1745 to over 50,000 in 1773, more than the combined output of all other British sugar 
islands.17 As ambitious Jamaican settlers extended the cultivation of sugar, the greatest threats 
to expansion came not from metropolitan opposition but from enslaved people, who reacted 
when they could with various forms of resistance, including violent uprisings. But they could 
do little to slow Jamaican economic expansion.18 By the time of the outbreak of the American 
Revolutionary War in 1775, plantation agriculture was extending into new regions of an 
                                                                                                                                                        
Westminster and the Campaign to Preserve the Slave Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014). For a detailed recent exploration of the transatlantic family and business networks of 
the most powerful of eighteenth-century Jamaican planters, see Perry Gauchi, William 
Beckford: First Prime Minister of the London Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2013). 
15 Richard B. Sheridan, ‘The Formation of Caribbean Plantation Society, 1689–1748’, in 
Oxford History of the British Empire: The Eighteenth Century, ed. Marshall, 394-414, at 401; 
Edward Long, The History of Jamaica, 3 vols (London, 1774), vol. 2, 229. 
16 On colonial politics, see Trevor Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny, and Desire: Thomas 
Thistlewood and his Slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican World (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004), 76-79; Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica, 15-16, 61-2. The white 
population of Jamaica in 1788 was about 18,500 and there were around 770 sugar estates on 
the island, with some planters owning more than one estate. ‘Return of the Number of White 
Inhabitants, Free People of Colour and Slaves in the Island of Jamaica’, enclosed in Governor 
Clarke to Lord Sydney, 20 Nov. 1788, National Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter NA), CO137, 
Jamaica Governors’ Correspondence, vol. 87, f. 173; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 223. 
17 Deer, History of Sugar, vol. 1, 193-202. 
18 See Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). 
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island that had come to contribute as much to the national economy of Britain as any sizeable 
English county.19 
 
The American Revolution 
Their economic power helped to secure for the Jamaican planter class a comfortable position 
at the heart of the eighteenth-century British Empire. Because so much of the scholarship on 
the planters deals with the era of abolition, our idea of this group tends to dwell on its outsider 
or pariah status. It is true that, even before they encountered sustained criticism from 
abolitionists, some British commentators questioned white West Indian behaviour, worrying 
that slaveholding produced dissolute behaviour, excessive pride and tyrannous tendencies in 
masters.20 But Caribbean planters were just one of several groups in the Hanoverian British 
world to attract suspicion or jealousy and, before the 1780s, were less loathed by metropolitan 
English commentators than Scots or East Indian nabobs.21 As Andrew O’Shaughnessy has 
demonstrated, Caribbean planters were generally confident of their status and content with 
their privileged place within the British Atlantic world of the 1760s and 1770s.22 They failed 
to see the extent to which the gathering storm of imperial conflict threatened their interests. 
The American Revolution was an uprising of fellow white colonials, many of them 
slaveholders, whose rhetoric of colonial rights and constitutional liberties made sense to some 
                                                 
19 Burnard, ‘Et in Arcadia Ego’, 34. 
20 See Sarah E. Yeh, ‘“A Sink of All Filthiness”: Gender, Family, and Identity in the British 
Atlantic, 1688–1763’, The Historian 68, no. 1 (2006): 66-88; Michal J. Rozbicki, The 
Complete Colonial Gentleman: Cultural Legitimacy in Plantation America (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1998), 76-126. 
21 West Indian planters were more firmly integrated into the imperial economy and English 
ruling class than their East Indian counterparts and lacked the taint of Jacobitism used by 
Wilkite radicals to present prominent Scots as threats to English freedom. On Scots and East 
Indian ‘nabobs’, see Colley, Britons, 105-17; Tillman W. Nechtman, Nabobs: Empire and 
Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 156-
7. 
22 O’Shaughnessy, Empire Divided. 
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West Indian slaveholders, even if they chose not to push their own claims against 
metropolitan power to the same extent. But before the outbreak of hostilities, most of the 
white elite in the Caribbean failed to see that they shared a common political cause with the 
North Americans, opposing the American Revolution and hoping that the British Atlantic 
empire would heal as a united community. For example, Simon Taylor was minded to see the 
constitutional rhetoric of the North Americans about the rights of their legislatures as ‘a 
specious argument’. In common with parliamentarians in London, he suspected it was a cover 
for their real intention of breaking free from the Navigation Acts and anticipated that open 
conflict might finally reconcile the North Americans to their place within the empire.23 When 
white colonials on the North American mainland renounced their attachment to the British 
Empire, Taylor and his fellow Caribbean planters remained loyal to the mother country and 
found themselves plunged into a costly and dangerous conflict. By 1779 the war between 
Britain and its North American colonies had widened into an imperial conflict against France 
and Spain, bringing suffering to Jamaica. A crisis of subsistence, brought about by disruption 
to the trade in plantation supplies from North America, caused famine among enslaved people. 
Meanwhile, white colonists became weary of long and disruptive periods of martial law and 
militia service as the threat of invasion loomed. By 1782, a Franco-Spanish expeditionary 
force was poised to try to take the island back into the Spanish Empire, only to be narrowly 
foiled by Admiral Rodney’s naval victory over a French fleet at the Battle of the Saintes.24 
                                                 
23 Taylor to Chaloner Arcedeckne, Kingston, 5 June 1775, in Trade, Travel and Power in the 
Atlantic, 1765–1884, ed. Betty Wood and Martin Lynn (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 148-9. Taylor’s concerns about North America and the Navigation Acts were 
firmly in line with those of British parliamentarians at this time, as outlined by Stephen 
Conway in ‘Another Look at the Navigation Acts and the Coming of the American 
Revolution’, in The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic World, c.1750-1820, ed. John 
McAleer and Christer Petley (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2016): 77-96. 
24 Richard B. Sheridan, ‘The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the British West Indies during and 
after the American Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1976): 615-641; 
O’Shaughnessy, Empire Divided, 232-7. 
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After these difficulties and scares, the planters of Jamaica expected to reap the rewards of 
fidelity to their empire.  
Instead, the British government adopted new policies on colonial tax and trade that did 
nothing to reconcile this presumptuous group of imperial subjects. In 1781, while the war 
raged on, and the fate of Jamaica still hung in the balance, the prime minister, Lord North, 
dramatically increased the duty on British-Caribbean sugar entering the United Kingdom. A 
duty that was a little under 6s. 4d. per hundredweight in 1776 now rose to over 11s. 8d. In 
Jamaica, Taylor wrote, ‘the minds of people’ were ‘much dissatisfied and growing more and 
more so daily’ as a result of the new duty.25 North later justified the decision by reminding 
Jamaican planters that the war ‘threatened every part of the British empire’, but the heaviest 
financial costs had fallen on the metropole. The higher duty was therefore ‘consistent with the 
general interests of the empire’. These arguments echoed the rationale for the Stamp Act in 
the months following the Seven Years War and made it plain to West Indian colonists that 
they were being asked to help pay for a costly war and to make a fuller contribution to an 
empire that offered them physical and commercial protection. Rather than responding to West 
Indian complaints by lowering the duty, the government raised it further in the years that 
followed.26 
Tax rises might have proved more palatable to planters had the post-war empire more 
fully resembled that of the pre-war era. Some clung to the hope of restoring the old empire of 
1775. As late as 1783 Taylor wrote that ‘America may still be ours as soon as the present 
rancour subsides’. So long as Americans were no longer ‘inflamed’ by the belief ‘that Britain 
                                                 
25 Taylor to Arcedeckne, 28 Aug. 1781, Cambridge University Library, Vanneck-Arcedeckne 
papers, 3A (hereafter CUL), 1781/21. 
26 Ragatz, Fall of the Planter Class, 165; Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, 11 Nov. 1783. 
The duty stood at 15s. per hundredweight by 1791 and had risen to 27s. per hundredweight by 
1805. ‘Account of Rates of Duty on British Plantation Sugar imported into Great Britain, 
1776-1826’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, 1826, XXII (328). 
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wants to make them slaves and destroy them’, then peace could ‘soften their minds’, allow 
‘the moderate men to come in play’ and show to ‘their zealots’ the ‘mad part they had been 
acting’ in refusing to accept generous British terms. In beseeching ministers to seek 
reconciliatory policies with the United States, the Jamaican planter-politician Bryan Edwards 
remarked that Americans remained connected to Britons ‘by the dearest ties of consanguinity’ 
and could yet prove themselves ‘our best friends and customers in peace, and in war our 
firmest allies’.27 These were the hopes of Jamaican planters whose familiar imperial landscape 
had been torn apart by the American Revolution. Like other Britons who had gloried in the 
pre-war transatlantic empire, American independence had ‘cut the ground from under their 
feet’, and they now tried to imagine a future in which the pre-war transatlantic community 
could re-establish itself on new footings.28  
In March 1783, Taylor had assumed that American independence would cause the 
London government to frame ‘new navigation laws’.29 Instead they enforced the old ones in a 
policy that, as Edwards recognised, treated ‘our late brethren’ in the United States ‘in all 
respects as a foreign people’, ‘as aliens and strangers’.30 The Navigation Acts regulated 
commerce between British colonial and foreign ports, and their enforcement after 1783 
restricted the access of American shipping to British West Indian markets, disrupting a trade 
on which the plantation economies of the British West Indies had long relied for supplies of 
food and timber and as a vent for part of their exports. These restrictions came as a shock to 
Caribbean planters and dashed their hopes for a special relationship between Britain and 
America through a rapid rapprochement and return to the pre-war status quo. 
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 Although Jamaican planters learned to cope with the economic changes of the 1780s, 
raised duties and restrictions on trade revealed the principle on which slaveholding colonists 
had calculated their loyalty during the American crisis – namely the privileged place of the 
Caribbean sugar colonies in the empire – to be false.31 ‘If we are the most favoured subjects’, 
exclaimed Taylor after the upward hike in duties, ‘God help the rest’.32 Edwards, in his 
critique of the trade restriction with the United States, took a comparable view, characterising 
the ‘system of Great Britain to her few remaining colonies’ as ‘war, under the name of peace, 
against the most valuable of her plantations’.33 In 1784 planters from the Jamaican parish of 
Clarendon complained to the assembly that ‘after the repeated marks of loyalty which 
distinguished this island in the late war’ it was with ‘infinite concern’ that they found 
themselves singled out ‘as the only part of his majesty’s dominions which is not to participate 
in the blessings of peace’. They warned that they were now ‘called upon either to risk their 
lives, by conforming to impolitic and sordid restrictions of their trade, or to consult their 
preservation, at the expence of their obedience’. A petition from another parish complained 
that ‘their staple commodity’ was so injudiciously taxed ‘as to threaten ruin’ or ‘compel them 
to emigrate to some country, where their labour and industry would be gratefully encouraged’. 
In a petition to the king, the assembly echoed this threat, predicting that ‘such planters who 
have it in their power, will emigrate, with their families and slaves, to happier countries’.34  
Taylor shared his frustration at the disagreeable new imperial policies with his close 
friend Chaloner Arcedeckne, an absentee Jamaican plantation owner who lived in England. In 
the letters he wrote from Jamaica, Taylor appears to have assumed that Arcedeckne shared his 
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views, treating their correspondence as a means of venting his rising anger about metropolitan 
attitudes. In 1783, he complained that British politicians had come to see the colonies only as 
‘objects of taxation’ and claimed that this was ‘uniform to their whole conduct’ over the 
previous 20 years. A contented loyalist up until at least 1775, Taylor was now beginning to 
backdate his grievances, perceiving that London’s hostility to the West Indian colonies had 
begun after the conclusion of the Seven Years War in 1763. Taylor was so disillusioned that 
his writing increasingly came to feature claims that ministers at home were conspiring against 
Jamaica as well as threats that he and his fellow colonials might be forced to contemplate 
taking the same sort of extreme actions as the North Americans. ‘God knows’, he exclaimed, 
that ‘it requires no great force to keep us from going into rebellion’ but ‘by their enormous 
taxes one would imagine they wish to drive us into it’.35 The 1780s began, therefore, with 
British slaveholding colonists like Taylor beginning to reassess their place within a changing 
empire, rethinking their history, worrying about their future, and radicalising their politics. 
 
The Abolitionist Challenge 
The closing years of the 1780s saw recently radicalised colonial planters clash with an 
emerging abolitionist movement. The Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade 
formed in London in 1787 and began to campaign for an Act of Parliament to end trading in 
slaves from Africa in British ships. The prominent Church of England Evangelical, William 
Wilberforce, took up the cause, leading the parliamentary campaign and becoming the bête 
noire of the British planter class, as evidenced by Taylor’s various references to him as ‘the 
miscreant’, ‘fanatick’, ‘that hell-begotten imp’.36 In 1788 the House of Commons received 
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over 100 petitions calling for Parliament to end the slave trade, and in May of the next year it 
discussed Wilberforce’s proposal for its abolition – the first of several such debates to take 
place in the Commons and Lords during the next 18 years.37 In opening the debate, 
Wilberforce spoke about the abuse of enslaved people on the notorious Middle Passage 
between Africa and the Caribbean as well as on the sugar plantations. He presented abolition 
as a patriotic crusade against inhumanity and reflected on ‘the magnitude of the subject’ he 
was raising, ‘in which the interests, not of this country, nor of Europe alone, but of the whole 
world, and of posterity, are involved’. The Jamaican assembly soon produced a dissonant 
reaction, reflecting in November 1789 on the ‘magnitude of a question, which involves in it 
our property, our characters, and every interest that is dear and valuable to ourselves and our 
posterity’.38  
As the governor commented, news about the British debates on the slave trade had 
raised ‘great alarm’ in Jamaica, provoking anxiety amongst ‘all ranks’ of white colonials 
‘upon the issue of a question in which their all is involved’.39 The planters of the assembly 
were quick to realise that the new idea of a British civilising mission augured ill for them. The 
attack on the slave trade was especially problematic for those in Jamaica, a frontier colony 
where demand for imported slave labour remained strong. Deaths of slaves outnumbered 
births on the plantations, and so the slave trade was instrumental to their economy.40 Also, as 
the Jamaican assembly pointed out, white artisans, craftsmen, and plantation managers all 
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tried to ‘save something out of their salaries’ to lay out ‘in the purchase of slaves’. The 
dynamism of the sugar economy and security of the island depended on these aspirant settlers 
– the men who worked as managers on or provided vital services to the sugar estates, or who 
made other contributions to the local economy and served in the militia.41 The assembly was 
keen to underline that an immediate end to the trade in slaves would restrict the sugar 
economy and the expansion of white settlement. This, they urged, would have a deleterious 
effect on the prosperity of Jamaica and the wider British-Atlantic economy, and it would 
impinge upon the opportunities and expectations of entrepreneurial Britons working within a 
system that previous governments had encouraged and protected. From this perspective, 
abolitionist proposals threatened to tear up a long-standing compact between the home 
government and colonial settlers. They therefore came as a profound shock to colonial 
slaveholders, who found it difficult to understand how metropolitan ideas had diverged so 
quickly from their own vision of how the empire should work. ‘I really do not know what to 
say or write on that subject’, Taylor confessed, describing abolitionism as ‘a strange phrensy’ 
gripping the nation at home and ‘an axe to the root of their most valuable commerce’: 
‘madness . . . of the most serious nature’.42 
In 1789, as abolitionists proposed to stem a vital component of the British-Atlantic 
plantation system by an act of parliamentary fiat, white colonials extended their constitutional 
claims and questioned their relationship with the mother country. ‘The rights of the British 
colonists are as inviolable as those of their fellow-citizens within any part of the British 
dominions’, proclaimed the Jamaican assembly, in a remonstration addressed directly to the 
House of Commons, noting that the constitution of the empire did not ‘give omnipotence to a 
British parliament’. It concluded that ending the slave trade would be ‘subversive of all public 
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faith and confidence, as applied to the colonists; and must ultimately tend to alienate their 
affections from the parent state’. This hinted heavily at their right to resistance, which was a 
cornerstone of the seventeenth-century political revolutions on which the transatlantic British 
state was founded. It was a clear statement that West Indian legislatures could not accept 
abolition without a struggle.43  
The remonstration of 1789 was a radicalisation of the planters’ position, not only 
because it questioned the right of Parliament to legislate on a branch of overseas commerce 
but also because of the strident way that it presented the contingent nature of colonial loyalty. 
It arrived in Britain while Parliament was rebutting calls for the repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts and digesting the implications of the first phase of the French Revolution. 
The London agent of the Jamaican assembly, Stephen Fuller, dutifully printed the 
remonstration and circulated it to MPs, but he calculated it was best not to present it formally 
to the House of Commons. Fuller was worried by the new strain of radicalism that had begun 
to take root in Jamaica, in part because he knew that it could be used to associate the planters 
with new and troubling forces of liberty and revolution emerging in France, Britain and 
elsewhere around the Atlantic world.44 
But Jamaican planters had their own ideas about liberty and revolution, relating those 
concepts to their own struggles with British humanitarians and metropolitan authority while 
dreaming about possible ways out of their predicament. In April 1788, Taylor reflected on the 
potential for a white rebellion in Jamaica. Making clear references to the American 
Revolution, he wrote that ‘the French are near enough to us to take us under their protection’, 
adding that ‘armaments to the West Indies would be as fatal as to North America’. People in 
Britain, he remarked, ‘forget that Hispaniola is not more than 28 leagues from us’, Cuba ‘only 
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a nights run’. ‘We are by no means desirous or willing to separate from Britain’, he declared, 
but ‘if the slave trade is abolished . . . I shall that moment wish the separation to take place 
that instant, and for ever.’ As the possibility of war with Spain loomed in 1790, Taylor 
claimed it ‘had not given the alarm’ in Jamaica ‘that in other circumstances it would have 
done’ because the ‘cursed treatment’ that colonists had received over the ‘slave business’ 
meant that none could be persuaded ‘to take up arms or risque their lives’ to defend the 
colony. Colonists were at that moment prepared, if it came to it, to ‘change masters . . . 
without any reluctance’.45 
 The Jamaican assembly predicted that in the event of abolition, the majority of white 
colonists would ‘hoard up all they can save’, before migrating to ‘settle in the United States of 
America’.46 In December 1789, Taylor claimed that many white colonists, himself included, 
were determined to migrate ‘to Hispaniola’, by which he meant French Saint-Domingue, the 
largest possession in the French-Caribbean and the most productive sugar colony in the 
world.47 He wrote these words while France was moving towards a constitutional government 
and whites in Saint-Domingue were successfully pushing for increased liberties vis-à-vis the 
metropole.48 Also, as the planters and their political allies were keen to point out, while the 
British Parliament discussed the abolition of the slave trade, the French government offered 
new financial rewards to merchants who imported enslaved Africans into its colonies.49 These 
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were months of uncertainty and promise (as well as danger) for white colonials throughout the 
Caribbean. Taylor remarked that the Spaniards who came from Cuba to the north coast of 
Jamaica to trade cattle and wood ‘begin to talk big’ that they would soon be as free as the 
English.50 In these changing times, Taylor hinted at a possible new beginning for Caribbean 
colonies. ‘I positively do not think that in the course of ten years, there will be one belonging 
to Britain’, he speculated in 1790, so long as ‘the French National Assembly establish 
themselves on a secure footing, and form any thing like an efficient constitution’.51  
There is nothing to suggest that Taylor was an extremist voice in Jamaican politics, 
out of step with the views of other white slaveholding contemporaries on the island. He cut a 
respectable figure. As a leading landowner and longstanding member of the local assembly, 
he entertained a succession of governors, offering them hospitality and friendship.52 
Governors recognised him as an influential assemblyman, and though they found him to be 
much like many of the other planters in the legislature – difficult and often obstructive – there 
is nothing to suggest that they saw his political instincts as being at all out of touch with the 
mainstream of local opinion.53 In fact, Taylor was more conservative than many of his 
contemporaries. During the American Revolutionary War, he continued to support the 
ministry of Lord North long after other Jamaican planters had begun to shower it with 
criticism. Taylor thought the disloyal tone of some of his fellow planters risked the reputation 
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of the island and had no time for firebrands, radicals, revolutionaries or democrats.54 He was 
not an instinctive rebel.  
His oppositional ideas developed during the 1780s from the idea that British colonial 
policy and the support that abolition received inside Parliament threatened the constitution of 
the empire as he understood it – exploiting planters, devaluing their property, and interfering 
with their institutions without their consent. Taken alongside the increasingly strident tone of 
the local legislature in which he sat, Taylor’s words indicate that, as a liberal spirit of 
revolution began to spread around the Atlantic world, Jamaican planters started to imagine 
themselves in the same situation as settlers in the thirteen mainland American colonies during 
the 1760s and 1770s, who had defied the London government in defence of their definitions 
of British liberty. 
Once-loyal colonials toyed with treason. In Taylor’s case, rebellious fantasies and 
ideas about leaving Jamaica not only reflected his frustration, they may also be read as efforts 
to present a picture of the local political situation that he hoped would leave a strong 
impression on his correspondent. Taylor communicated most of his declarations of 
dissatisfaction to Chaloner Arcedeckne, who played an important role in the London West 
India group of planters and merchants. Taylor probably wanted Arcedeckne to worry about 
the prospect of a white rebellion in the hope that it might urge his friend to work with the 
wider West India lobby to warn Members of Parliament about the abolitionist threat to 
imperial unity. The motivations of the assembly might have been similar when preparing a 
remonstration that raised the prospect of a constitutional conflict and colonial disloyalty. 
Keen to persuade people in the metropole of the gravity of the situation, Taylor in his letters 
and the assembly in its 1789 remonstration to Parliament, presented dramatic predictions of 
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colonial resistance to metropolitan authority. They might have been deliberate exaggerations. 
But, nonetheless, such threats needed to be plausible to be effective. There can be little doubt 
that they represented a rising spirit of colonial rebelliousness, and Jamaican colonists had a 
long tradition of resisting metropolitan authority, even if their outright secession from the 
British Empire remained an unlikely prospect. 
British statesmen might have encountered severe, even violent, opposition from 
slaveholders in Jamaica had Parliament chosen to end the slave trade at the beginning of the 
1790s. The colonists of the island certainly gave them cause to worry that the white colonial 
rebelliousness that was revolutionising the French Caribbean might spread to the colonies of 
the British Caribbean.55 With memories of the recent lost war for America still strong, 
parliamentarians hesitated to take measures that could disrupt the most lucrative part of the 
imperial economy and upset the wealthiest and most powerful group of colonists in what 
remained of their transatlantic empire. The only consequential breakthrough during the 
upsurge of British abolitionist fervour during the late 1780s was a Parliamentary Act of 1788, 
which regulated the slave trade by limiting the number of enslaved people who could be 
crammed onto British ships.56 Wilberforce’s parliamentary agitation for abolition therefore 
sparked debate in Britain and led to impassioned claims about settler rights in the colonies, 
but it did not resolve anything. It instead threatened to throw the British transatlantic empire 
into a crisis to match that of the British Atlantic in the 1770s or the French Atlantic during the 
years after 1789. 
 
Revolution and War 
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Planters had every reason to feel that they could weather the crisis. The Jamaican assembly 
could draw on its experience of past conflicts over its rights and privileges and had a powerful 
transatlantic consortium of political allies, including MPs and a London society of planters 
and merchants with impressive lobbying power and access to ministers. Taylor remained 
sanguine that the planters might defeat the abolitionists without resorting to the sorts of 
extremes he threatened in his letters. ‘I am very glad to find that we have so many friends in 
the House’, he wrote, after the defeat of Wilberforce’s first abolition bill in the Commons, and 
he even speculated that, if the abolitionists could be persuaded to stop ‘where they are, they 
will have done a good deal of service, by making people use their negroes better than they did 
before’.57  
The confidence and optimism of Jamaican planters was shattered, however, and their 
political options narrowed, first by the slave uprising in Saint Domingue and then by the 
outbreak of war with Revolutionary France. Historians have generally presented those events 
as bigger problems for abolitionists than for planters, because they deepened the fears of the 
British ruling class about popular calls for reform, allowing the West Indian interest to present 
Wilberforce and his colleagues as Jacobins in disguise.58 However, revolution and war in the 
Caribbean also terrified colonial slaveholders, limiting their willingness to confront 
Parliament over the question of the slave trade.59 In the long-term their effects were to prove 
most damaging to Jamaican planters. 
In 1789, the prospects of French planters were bright. But the enfranchisement of free 
men of colour in Saint Domingue and the slave uprising that broke out across its northern 
plains in August 1791, when thousands of enslaved people burned plantations and killed 
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white slaveholders, transformed the colony in the minds of British planters from a model for 
emulation into a dangerous threat to their very existence. Now it was Dominguan planters 
who contemplated switching their allegiances, making an active effort to persuade British 
statesmen to take their colony into the British Empire.60 In 1793, Taylor, who had so recently 
considered migrating to Saint Domingue, noted that colonists there were ‘in a more dreadful 
situation than ever’, with nothing going on ‘but murders and massacres’.61 He and his fellow 
Jamaican planters now recoiled from this new age of emancipatory revolution into the 
protective arms of the British imperial state.  
The very character of slavery ensured that masters were always on their guard. From 
the beginning of the abolition debates in Parliament, they warned that British discussions of 
antislavery principles might incite Caribbean slaves to revolt. For instance, claims about the 
‘horrid spirit of the Negroes’ were an important characteristic of the way that Fuller lobbied 
against the abolitionists between 1788 and 1791.62 Drawing on the news he received from 
colonists in the Caribbean, he claimed that the rebellious tendencies of enslaved people were 
emboldened by the abolitionist campaign and that an island-wide massacre of whites was 
likely. There was, perhaps, some genuine fear of an uprising, but the most important priorities 
of the proslavery lobby when raising the spectre of insurrection at this time were rhetorical. 
They hoped to promote empathy for supposedly imperilled white British colonials over that 
for black African slaves and to present abolition as an existential threat to economically 
productive British colonies. The possibility of a revolt was certainly plausible enough to allow 
for such lines of argument, but Taylor’s letters show that a planter could complain about 
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being exposed to this sort of danger while simultaneously fantasising about embarking on a 
rebellion of his own, probably because, before the Saint Domingue uprising, Jamaican 
planters had not witnessed a large-scale slave revolt for more than three decades. 
Events in the neighbouring French colony rekindled their genuine fear of insurrection. 
In November 1791, the Jamaican assembly addressed the crown, seeking enhanced military 
protection for the island in loyal language not seen in planter politics since the 1770s. The 
‘dutiful and loyal subjects’ of the assembly wrote that their new ‘apprehensions and terrors’ 
caused them to look to the king on ‘whose paternal care for our safety and preservation we 
solely depend for the efficient protection which will ensure our security’. Attempting to use 
events to tar their opponents, they claimed the ‘wild and enthusiastic doctrines’ of the 
abolitionists had been ‘severely felt by the French inhabitants of St. Domingo’ and now made 
the lives and properties of slaveholders in Jamaica precarious. That threat would remain while 
the insurrection in Saint Domingue continued to exhibit to Jamaican slaves ‘a precedent of 
triumph of savage anarchy over all order and government’.63 
 Militarisation followed. The governor called out the militia, which had not seen 
service since the invasion scare of 1782. The assembly instructed its agent in London, 
Stephen Fuller, to purchase armaments for the militiamen to the value of £12,736. 
Recognising the importance of imperial troops as a deterrent against slave insurrections, it 
also agreed to pay for the quartering of additional regular troops on the island.64 
Some Jamaican whites resented this expensive and draconic turn, fearing it might 
impinge on their own liberties, to the point that one body of militiamen threatened an 
assemblyman who reportedly had suggested flogging as a punishment for the militia rank and 
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file. Sections of the elite showed frustration with outspoken poor whites on this question, but 
no serious conflict broke out between white colonials, as they fell into line as stout British 
loyalists.65 At the end of 1792, the planters of the assembly wrote to the king expressing 
satisfaction that white colonial society evinced little sign of the divisive and democratic unrest 
shown by sections of the British public in the metropole. The men of the assembly reported 
that they had ‘seen with indignation the attempts that have been made to excite tumult and 
disorder’ by seditious publications at home but were happy that ‘no such disposition has 
hitherto made its appearance’ in Jamaica. The assembly reminded the king and, by 
implication, his ministers that the new spirit of revolution nevertheless imperilled his loyal 
colonists, who depended ‘on an equal participation of that parental care and anxiety for our 
security’ with all his other subjects.66 This right to care and protection now competed more 
awkwardly than at any previous time with the planters’ continued claims about their right to 
control their own affairs, free from metropolitan interference. 
 Common engagement in a patriotic war effort generally placed a greater onus on the 
colonial periphery to show its fealty to the imperial centre than on the London government to 
indulge contrary colonists, skewing the colonial ‘tussle’ between the ‘desire for 
independence’ and ‘need for imperial defence’.67 Those factors were amplified by the type of 
conflict that developed after the beginning of hostilities between Britain and Revolutionary 
France in 1793. The outbreak of war with France brought familiar problems: disruption to 
Jamaican trade by enemy privateering and the threat of coastal raids. But in 1794, when the 
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French ended slavery in its overseas empire, heightened slaveholder insecurity was 
compounded by a new era of revolutionary warfare, the enemy now seeking to disrupt British 
power and wealth in the Caribbean by exporting revolution through slave uprisings.68 
Colonial slaveholders and British politicians alike were fearful of republican ‘anarchy’ in the 
Caribbean and keen to reinforce the security of the British islands. 
Under those circumstances, the British slaveholders reined in their own radical 
pretensions while trying to demonstrate the interdependence of colonial and metropolitan 
interests and pointing out the dangerous revolutionary credentials of their opponents.69 In the 
autumn of 1792, Taylor hoped the French Revolution would teach the ruling class in England 
that it was ‘much better to go on in the old beaten track, than to try new experiments’.70 The 
Jamaican assembly pursued the same line of argument, claiming that British commerce was at 
risk and colonial security sacrificed because abolitionists, who it described as ‘a set of 
fanatics, enemies to all kinds of government but mere democracies’, had chosen to slander the 
prevailing order of things in the colonies.71 
 During the 1790s, this helped keep abolitionism at bay. Although the House of 
Commons agreed in 1792 to a bill for the gradual ending of the slave trade, this was blocked 
in the more reactionary House of Lords, and the proposal was eventually abandoned. New 
fears of political radicalism subdued the abolition movement in and outside of Parliament.72 
The London abolition committee abandoned the use of mass petitions while distancing itself 
from political radicals and grass-roots campaigners. Fearful of being accused of sedition, 
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leading abolitionist Thomas Clarkson withdrew from public life for almost 10 years.73 
Meanwhile, West Indian commerce was as important as ever to the British Empire. This was 
an economic boom time for British-Caribbean slaveholders, as planters capitalised on the 
breach in the market left by the cessation of sugar production in Saint Domingue. Jamaican 
production soared and new land was opened to cultivation; the local economy grew and the 
island replaced its French neighbour as the biggest global supplier of sugar. Parliamentarians 
were also distracted from abolitionism by the war effort in the Caribbean, which saw vast 
British forces sail to the West Indies, failing to seize Saint Domingue but successfully 
conquering several other islands.74 The decade ended with abolitionism muted, a vastly 
expanded British slave empire and new prospects for British sugar production. But despite 
these circumstances, fear was more significant than triumphalism for British colonial planters. 
High profits and relief from abolitionist pressure could not outweigh the shock and anxiety 
unleashed by the events in Saint Domingue. 
 
The Abolition of the Slave Trade 
The radicalisation of the transatlantic French Revolution and the outbreak of war between 
Britain and Revolutionary France transformed the debate over slavery, and although planters 
minted political capital from these events in the short term, they were seriously weakened by 
the, in the long-term. In 1792, Prime Minister Pitt was one of the first British statesmen to 
recognise the rhetorical opportunity that the slave uprising in Saint Domingue offered to 
abolitionism. Pitt, who lent his personal backing to the cause of abolition, raised an argument 
about ‘the danger to which the islands are exposed from those negroes who are newly 
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imported’. The reckless importation of many potentially rebellious enslaved Africans, he 
maintained, ‘may annihilate in a single day the industry of a hundred years’, and he did not 
want to expose the ‘important interests’ of the plantation economy in the sugar islands to 
further danger. He told the House of Commons that he was satisfied that ‘among the many 
arguments for prohibiting the Slave Trade’ the fact that abolition would best preserve ‘the 
security of our West India possessions against internal commotions, as well as foreign 
enemies, is among the most prominent and most forcible’. War did not steer Pitt away from 
this view. At the height of the Caribbean campaign, he continued to advocate ‘speedy and 
immediate abolition’, believing that this was best ‘with regard to the safety of the islands’ as 
well as ‘with a view to the cause of humanity and justice’.75 
Fighting against Revolutionary France in the Caribbean proved expensive. Between 
1793 and 1798, it cost the British state around £20,000,000. Nearly 90,000 British servicemen 
went to the West Indian theatre of the war between 1793 and 1801; about half of them died 
there, many from tropical fevers. This augmented the abolitionist image of the West Indies as 
a place of cruelty with revivified visions of a torrid warzone, characterised by pestilence and 
death.76 It also strengthened the idea that those colonies whose protection demanded such a 
price in British treasure and blood ought to be subject to the British legislature. One 
incumbent of the War and Colonial Office noted that ‘so long as’ the Jamaican assembly 
expected ‘a system to be maintained which must continually call upon Great Britain for the 
employment in an unhealthy climate of her best European soldiers for their protection, it 
seems irreconcilable . . . that they should resort to a principle of total independence of the 
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British Parliament’.77 Those principles meant that despite considerable imperial expansion, no 
newly conquered colony was granted a legislative assembly, and the economic ambitions of 
white settlers in new territories were thwarted by British parliamentary legislation that limited 
their access to land and to imported enslaved labour.78 The imperial government, keen to keep 
political control and avoid extremes of social volatility, thereby broke with the principles that 
had shaped its eighteenth-century colonial system, choosing neither to enfranchise settlers nor 
to unleash the full force of an untrammelled sugar-revolution in its expanded American 
empire. 
Colonial security and questions of imperial governance shaped the changing debate 
over the slave trade throughout the war years. Taylor complained in impotent disbelief that 
Pitt and Wilberforce were continually ‘blowing the trumpet of sedition among our slaves’ by 
arguing in favour of abolition. His fear of an uprising caused his projected schemes of 
disloyal opposition to British authority to dissolve. Petrified of a French-inspired slave 
revolution, Jamaican slaveholders wanting to find an alternative to British ‘oppression’ now 
looked in vain for a foreign power that could, as Taylor put it, ‘protect their lives and not 
exhort their slaves to cut their throats’.79 Their political position was further weakened by 
events in Saint Domingue. British efforts to take the colony ended in 1798, leaving it under 
the control of the revolutionary military commander Toussaint L’Overture, a former slave. 
Supporters of the planters recognised this as an important turning point, one of them 
commenting that ‘the historian who some time hence is to relate the downfall of Jamaica will 
trace the main thread of the story up to this event’.80 He was right to recognise the deep 
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significance of the British evacuation, which was followed by the defeat of the Napoleonic 
armada sent against L’Overture in 1802. But these were events that mattered to Jamaican 
planters not because the new nation of Haiti posed much of a direct physical threat to them, 
but because the failure to restore white control and slavery in Saint Domingue re-shaped the 
debate over the slave trade. 
Discussions about how best to contain and counter revolution in the turbulent 
Caribbean region allowed a new generation of abolitionists to develop Pitt’s argument that 
reforming the British slave system was the only way to secure the colonies against slave 
rebellions. They claimed that slaveholders were unable or unwilling to curb the brutality and 
injustice that created social volatility in the islands. They therefore demanded direct imperial 
legislation, including an immediate end to the slave trade, so that British colonies could avoid 
the fate of the French Caribbean.81 These were ideas that coincided neatly with many of the 
concerns and preconceptions of colonial administrators. In 1804, under-secretary for the War 
and Colonial Office, Edward Cooke, told the governor of Jamaica that the end of transatlantic 
slave trading would offer planters the ‘securest system’ of labour and was therefore in tune 
with their ‘immediate interests’. He was convinced that ending the supply of slaves from 
Africa would compel planters to treat their existing workforce better and reduce death rates on 
their properties. Cooke made the common (mistaken) assumption that newly imported 
Africans posed the greatest threat of rebellion and that, therefore, the end of the slave trade 
would help prevent slave uprisings. Earl Camden, the Colonial Secretary, took the same line, 
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thinking that the best way that Jamaica could avoid the fate of Saint Domingue was to 
‘prevent the necessity of importing fresh Negroes from Africa’.82 
Abolitionists, as one prominent proslavery campaigner observed, had successfully 
started to ‘turn by their own false reasoning all the dreadful warnings which the French and 
Spanish colonies are furnishing into arguments for the furtherance of their own wishes’. 
Prime Minister William Grenville made heavy use of the new arguments about the security of 
the colonies when he introduced the Abolition Act to the House of Lords in 1807, and, much 
to the dissatisfaction of slaveholders in the colonies, many of the young absentee owners of 
West Indian sugar estates were also convinced by the theory that an end to the slave trade 
would benefit colonial security.83 
By 1807, the short-term political and economic advantages presented to the British 
planter class by the Saint Domingue Revolution had gone.84 British slaveholders were divided 
amongst themselves about how to interpret the implications for the plantation colonies of the 
Haitian Revolution and were in a far weaker bargaining position than they had been two 
decades earlier.85 They were forced to accept abolition without the white revolt or mass 
migrations that the Jamaican planters had once threatened. The Jamaican assembly also failed 
to produce the sustained and effective opposition to imperial power that it had managed 
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during its mid-eighteenth-century apogee. It continued to assert a right to freedom from 
metropolitan interference, complaining in a series of public resolutions that the British 
Abolition Act was ‘pregnant with evils’, ‘subversive’ of their ‘local rights and legislative 
authority’, and that, by ‘depriving this extensive and yet unsettled island of the means of a 
supply of labourers from Africa to cultivate the soil’, it ‘must be eventually ruinous’. The 
assembly threated to refuse to pay for the quartering of troops, but this proved a short-lived 
and self-defeating bluff, falling flat in London and serving only to underline colonial 
weakness.86 On hearing about the passage of the Abolition Act, Taylor was ‘lost in 
astonishment and amazement at the phrensy which has seized the British nation to abandon 
her colonies in the way it has done’. He predicted it would ruin Jamaica and the other British 
islands ‘unless the French government makes a sweep of them’, which was impossible for the 
weakened Napoleonic navy in the aftermath of Trafalgar.87  
 
Conclusion 
At the height of the planters’ mid-eighteenth-century success, the Elder Pitt had announced 
that he thought of the sugar colonies in the same light ‘as the landed interests of this kingdom’, 
proclaiming it ‘a barbarism to consider them otherwise’.88 Lord North, prime minister during 
the American Revolutionary War, was reputed to have declared that the West Indian lobby in 
London were ‘the only masters he ever had’.89 During the final third of the eighteenth century, 
Jamaican planters might also have taken comfort that various other American and European 
landed elites were successfully warding off threatened state intervention on behalf of serfs and 
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slaves. Rulers and governments in Prussia, the Habsburg Empire, Russia and the United 
States all backtracked on proposals to interfere with slavery or serfdom, fearful of the effects 
that alienating a powerful landowning class might have on national, imperial or federal 
unity.90  
At what point did Jamaican sugar planters lose their status as the linchpins of their 
empire and with it their ability to defend their interests and institutions? There are some good 
reasons for suggesting that the 1780s saw the decisive shift in planter fortunes. Jamaican 
planter politics began to radicalise in 1781, as the British government began to pursue new 
policies on colonial import duties and the Navigation Acts. The American Revolution 
diminished the size of the transatlantic proslavery lobby during the 1780s and provided some 
of the political impetus that saw British antislavery develop into an articulate and influential 
movement for reform by the end of the decade. The planters who confronted it had already 
been through a decade of disasters and political setbacks. They were prepared, nonetheless, to 
confront it with all the political resources available to them. Observations that the argument 
‘against the West Indian plantation system was won very soon after it was begun’, during the 
1780s, or that simply ‘starting the debate’ about colonial slavery ‘served almost as well as 
winning it’, certainly capture the popular and intellectual mood in Britain during the 1780s. 
But the success of the abolition movement was not determined in that decade. The American 
Revolution was ‘a pivotal event in the history of British slavery’.91 But we should not over-
emphasise its importance to the defeat of the planters. 
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The rise of abolitionism during the 1780s appeared to represent what Seymour 
Drescher calls a ‘paradigmatic leap in the relationship between the British metropolis and the 
Atlantic slave system’, but it achieved few firm results.92 It proposed to reform a system 
entwined with the national economy, and British planters retained strong support in 
Parliament and from powerful government ministers. Jamaican slaveholders were very clearly 
determined to try to preserve their institutions within a changing transatlantic political scene 
and had a clear sense of ideological purpose, despite the anti-colonial animus that had 
developed in Britain. They made open declarations that imperial ‘oppression’ would result in 
the alienation of their affections for the empire and might persuade them to migrate to other 
parts of the Americas, and they projected a future in which colonists would meet British 
imperial impositions with ever fiercer forms of resistance. By the end of the 1780s, white 
Jamaican colonists appear to have been as willing as their North American and Dominguan 
counterparts to toy with ideas of disloyalty in defence of their rights and interests. 
It was the radicalisation of the French and Haitian Revolutions that provided the 
political context in which abolitionists could outmanoeuvre these slaveholders. The new age 
of revolution from below shattered the self-confidence of white slaveholding colonists in the 
British Empire, amplifying their fears over safety. It limited the options of any West Indian 
colonials who dreamed of leaving the British Empire, provided cautionary examples about the 
inherent security risks of slavery and slave trading, worsened the image of the Caribbean in 
the metropole, and provided new momentum to the extension of British imperial power over 
the sugar colonies. By the early nineteenth century, all of this had given parliamentarians new 
reasons to contemplate an end to the slave trade without having to worry about a disloyal 
reaction from planters in the colonies that might put at risk the integrity or security of the 
most valuable portion of their empire. 
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As he entered old age, Taylor was full of impotent anger over the abolition of the 
slave trade. He complained of growing ‘sick both in mind and body at scenes I foresee’ and 
was left to contemplate what might have been. ‘Had it not been for the overthrow of the 
French monarchy, I really and from my soul believe that if Mr Pitt and Mr Wilberforce had 
gone on as they have done’ that Britain would have lost all her island colonies of the West 
Indies, he reflected.93 It is impossible to tell what might have happened in the Caribbean had 
the French Revolution turned out differently, but it is nonetheless relevant that Taylor, an 
astute observer of transatlantic imperial politics, identified the radical turn of the French 
Revolution in 1793 as the pivotal event in the history of the British sugar colonies. He might 
have predated this turning point by a few months, because it had been the Saint Domingue 
slave uprising of 1791, compounded by the wars with France and then by the establishment of 
Haiti, that most weakened the planters’ defences against abolitionism. Perhaps Taylor 
preferred not to think too much about the role that rebellious slaves had played in determining 
his fate.  
Jamaican planters remained a powerful faction within the wider transatlantic 
proslavery lobby during the early nineteenth century. But their influence waned as the 
Jamaican plantation economy went into a slow decline during the years after the closing of 
the slave trade. It became easy to forget that these men had once defined themselves as 
paragons of British liberty and of imperial economic prosperity.94 By 1807, they were as 
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dependent as ever on British military protection, having been deeply fearful of a serious slave 
uprising for nearly 16 years. Unable to follow through on their earlier threats to offer serious 
resistance to the ending of the slave trade, they had been undermined by the political 
weaknesses that emancipatory revolution and incessant war imposed on the colonial 
assemblies. Those calling for an end to the slave trade had managed to convince Parliament 
that it was abolition, and not the slaveholders, that could better uphold not only the principles 
of British liberty but also the practicalities of colonial security. Under these new 
circumstances, the preferred vision of a man like Taylor for the future of the empire could be 
safely ignored. 
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